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A static income tax evasion model à la Yitzhaki (1974) predicts that an increase 
in the tax rate causes taxpayers to increase their income declaration. In an important 
contribution, Lin and Yang (2001) obtained exactly the opposite result by extending 
the Yitzhaki (1974) model to a dynamic one with Ak(t) production technology. In this 
paper we show that once the Lin and Yang (2001) model becomes fully compatible 
with the Yitzhaki’s (1974) setting, the negative relationship between taxes and 
evasion still prevails. We then enrich the dynamic model with a productive public sector, and 
obtain an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion incentives as in 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). We also prove that the growth-maximizing share of public 
expenditures in total output satisfies the natural efficiency condition even in the 
presence of tax evasion. However, the latter result is not robust to the introduction of the 
costs associated with income declaration and concealment activities. 
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 1. Introduction
Income tax evasion is one of the most important issues any country faces. This
phenomenon is not pertinent to developing countries only. Internal Revenue Service,
for instance, estimates that the tax gap, the diﬀerence between what taxpayers should
have paid by law and what they actually ended up paying, was as large as $345 billion
in the Unites States for the year 2001. Out of this, roughly 57 percent constituted the
individual income tax gap. Andreoni et al. (1998), based on the 1992 IRS study, report
that "...91.7 percent of all [U.S.] income that should have been reported, was in fact
reported". According to Engel and Hines (1998), individuals in the U.S. underreport
about 10.6 percent of their incomes annually. The picture is not more optimistic in
the rest of the world. In Greece and U.K., for example, the amount of tax evaded
is estimated to comprise 22.5 and 11.5 percent of total tax collections, respectively
(Gupta 2004).
It is not surprising, therefore, that the theoretical analysis of income tax evasion
has retained its importance since the seminal contribution of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), which has been further developed notably to incorporate some of the most
important features of economic environment.1 One particular aspect of Allingham-
Sandmo (1972) study was concerned with the relationship between the tax rate and
evasion incentives. The study showed that when the government raises the tax rate,
a taxpayer in response can either increase or decrease income declaration because of
competing income and substitution eﬀects. However, Shlomo Yitzhaki (1974) pointed
out in a two-page note to Allighman and Sandmo, that under some realistic assumptions
a typical risk averse individual will declare more income when the tax rate increases.
This is because when the penalty is imposed on the amount of evaded tax, as it is
under most current tax laws, the substitution eﬀect vanishes.
The latter ﬁnding spurred a lot of harsh criticisms2 since it goes against intuition and
much of the existing empirical evidence. Thus, there were no lack of attempts to reverse
the Yitzhaki (1974) result. It is worth mentioning, however, that those attempts often
deviated fairly signiﬁcantly from the Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki setting, with many
extensions taking place in a static framework.3 Dynamic models, although relatively
few, were no exception in that respect. For example, Niepelt (2005) showed that with
time-dependent penalty rates and costs arising from the taxpayer’s switching from "no
evasion" to "evasion" state, an increase in the tax rate raises the average duration
of an evasion spell. In an important contribution, Chen (2003), who to the best of
our knowledge was ﬁrst to develop a general equilibrium continuous time deterministic
1See Kolm (1973), Pencavel (1978), Cowell (1985) and Yaniv (1999),—to name just a few con-
tributions.
2See, e.g., Yaniv (1999) and Al-Nowaihi and Pyle (2000).
3See, e.g., Pencavel (1979), Cowell and Gordon (1988), Gordon (1989) and Yaniv (1999).
2model of tax evasion with public capital, shows that higher taxes increase evasion.
Although Chen (2003) never claims that the goal of his paper is to reverse the Yitzhaki
(1974) result, he establishes a positive relationship between the tax rate and evasion
incentives. Such a relationship is achieved via introducing transaction costs, which are
strictly increasing in evasion (see expression (7) on p. 386 in Chen 2003).
The ﬁrst important theoretical study of tax evasion in the context of the dynamic
portfolio choice model à la Merton (1969), comes from Lin and Yang (2001), who use
Ak(t) production technology. Their model does not seem to deviate from the Yitzhaki
(1974) setting in terms of modelling tax evasion: it simply extends the environment
from a static to a dynamic one, but produces at the same time a strikingly diﬀerent re-
sult that tax compliance is negatively associated with the tax rate. We argue, however,
that the Lin and Yang (2001) model follows the Yitzhaki (1974) model in the sense that
the penalty for tax evasion is set proportional to the amount of evaded tax liability. In
deriving the moments of the stochastic process of capital accumulation, however, Lin
and Yang (2001) assume that the decision-making taxpayer considers random return
on concealed income. However, considering return on a unit of income concealed is
appropriate for the Allingham-Sandmo (1972) environment, where ﬁnes are levied on
the amount of undeclared income. In the Yitzhaki (1974) model the taxpayer always
keeps in mind that what is under risk is the amount of tax evaded: either the taxpayer
pockets it all if not caught, or loses it all (plus pays some penalties on the top of that)
if caught. Considering the return on a unit of income concealed makes the variance of
the uncertain income independent of the tax rate. As it turns out, such a seemingly
unimportant detail is exactly what causes the Yitzhaki (1974) result to be reversed.
On the contrary, we make the model fully compatible with the Yitzhaki (1974) setting,
and obtain that higher taxes discourage evasion.4
After revisiting the Lin and Yang (2001) model, we extend it to account for the
productive public sector as in Barro (1990), and then we analyze the implications for
the optimal government size for a range of extensions.5 Incorporating the productive
4Caballé and Panadés (2001) pointed out that the Yitzhaki (1974) result holds in a discrete-time
counterpart of the continuous-time Lin and Yang (2001) setting. However, Caballé and Panadés
(2001) do not show this result in the continuous-time framework in order to avoid otherwise arising
technical diﬃculties, as they claim. The authors also hypothesize that the discrepancy between their
result and that of Lin and Yang (2001) is likely to arise because the variance of the Brownian motion
is not proportional to the tax rate in the latter. Further, in the discrete-time presentation Caballé and
Panadés (2001) obtain the consumption path which diﬀers from that in Lin and Yang (2001). As was
said above, in this paper we show where the result of the tax-independent variance comes from, and
namely in a continuous-time original setting of Lin and Yang (2001).
5It is worth noting that growth literature has been enriched in a variety of directions, and here
our aim is to keep the analytical setting concise. An interested reader might consult, among others,
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994) (modeling public input with varying degree of non-rivalry and non-
exclusiveness, with public investment in infrastructure ﬁnanced via uniform capital and labor income
3government enables to capture the interrelations between the tax rate, evasion, tax
collections and output. We show that as a result the relationship between the tax rate
and evasion will become ambiguous.6
We also introduce tax compliance/evasion costs, and show that accounting for
compliance/evasion costs leads to a larger optimal size of the public sector than in
Barro (1990).7
Our contribution in this paper can be summarized as follows:
 We make the Lin and Yang (2001) framework fully compatible with the Yitzhaki
(1974) speciﬁcation and show that higher taxes discourage evasion when Ak(t)
technology is assumed;
 We introduce public goods and to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to
enrich the Lin and Yang (2001) model in this way. This alone enables to establish
an ambiguous relationship between taxes and evasion. We also account for the
costs associated with income declaration/concealment;
 Finally, we investigate the implications of our model in the context of determining
the optimal government size. We show that the traditional natural eﬃciency
condition of the government size holds in our model, leading to identical economic
growth rates for economies with diﬀerent tax evasion rates. This diﬀers from the
Lin and Yang (2001) and Chen (2003) conclusions.
One of the main implications of our study is that the Yitzhaki (1974) ﬁnding is
"stubborn" enough to be reversed simply by extending the model to a dynamic setting.
taxation), Glomm and Ravikumar (1999) (introducing general preferences and technologies), and
Baier and Glomm (2001) (separately modeling human, public and private capital accumulation process
with elastic labor supply and non-unitary elasticity of substitution between public and private input).
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) in their authoritative paper carefully distinguish between the welfare
implications of the government consumptive (directly utility augmenting) and productive expenditures,
and allow for the former to be a substitute/complement for private consumption and work eﬀort, with
the latter exhibiting variable marginal physical product property. Other notable studies in this line of
research include Arrow and Kurz (1970), Aschauer (1989), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998),—to name
just a few.
6To be fair, in reality higher taxes not always unequivocally depress honesty incentives as can be
seen in Geeroms and Wilmots (1985) and Feinstein (1991). Previous studies revisiting the Yitzhaki
(1974) framework predominantly establish a clear-cut positive relationship between taxes and evasion.
Although the absence of ambiguity might theoretically be advantageous, it naturally leaves no room
for a potential explanation of diﬀering real-world evidence. Thus, our ﬁnding that higher taxes can
lower or increase evasion might help to explain a wider range of empirical evidences.
7See Cremer and Gahvari (1994), Sandford (1995), Tran-nam et al. (2000), Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(2002), and Buyer and Sutter (2004) for the discussions of the costs associated with tax evasion,
compliance and administration.
4Perhaps future research should shed more light on this. With that said, we now turn
to the model.
2. Modiﬁed Lin and Yang Economy







where A > 0;0 <  < 1, y(t) is output per capita, k(t) is per worker capital, g(t) is
per worker public input. It is assumed that the production function is stationary within
the planning horizon.
The government imposes an income tax at a ﬂat rate 0 <  < 1. To increase their
disposable income the agents evade taxes by under-reporting their true earnings. We
assume that the agent reports only (1 e(t))y(t) of his total income y(t) in per capita
terms, where 0 < e(t) < 1. To combat tax evasion the government audits taxpayers
randomly and detects the evasion with the joint probability, .
A detected evader pays back the due tax liability and some additional ﬁne. This
penalty is determined by a rate  = 1+s, which includes the tax evaded and a surcharge,
s. The tax paid by the agent is then either T(t) = (1   e(t))y(t) + e(t)y(t) with
probability , or T(t) = (1   e(t))y(t) with probability 1   . Consequently, the
expected tax payment for the agent is expressed as
 T(t) = (1   e(t))y(t) + e(t)y(t) (2)
The Lin and Yang (2001) model followed the Yitzhaki (1974) tax evasion model in
the sense that the penalty for tax evasion is proportional to the evaded tax. However,
in derivation of the variance of the stochastic process of tax evasion they considered
not the random return on evaded tax but the random return on concealed income.
Hence, the variance of the uncertain income in their model is treated as independent
of the tax rate. In any case, we cannot ignore the importance of the tax rate in the
risk structure. Therefore, our model focuses on capturing the risk associated with the
source of uncertainty, which is the amount of tax liability, not the entire concealed
income. Hence, the Lin and Yang (2001) model can be considered as a hybrid of the
Yitzhaki (1974) and the Alingham-Sandmo (1972) frameworks. In this paper we will
allow the random part of the income depend on the evaded tax as the gain or loss due
to evasion is related to this amount only.
The random part of the agent’s income can be described by the return on h
dollars of tax evaded: with probability  the return equals to r =  sh = (1 )h,
5and with probability 1 , equals r = h. Then the expected return on a unit of tax
evaded is found as
 r =   ( s) + (1   )  1 = 1   (1 + s) = 1    (3)
In general, if  > 1 then the taxpayers should not evade taxes. However, in the real
world, there is always some tax evasion, thus we can assume that  < 1 holds.
The cumulative change of the agent’s income, y(t)   y(0), follows a binomial
distribution as we have only two outcomes. It is known that the binomial random
process converges to a Brownian motion as the number of steps goes to inﬁnity. The
agent’s disposable income, yd(t), is a stochastic process and given by8
yd(t) = (1   )y(t) +  re(t)y(t) + [e(t)y(t)]W(t) (4)
where the ﬁrst two terms stand for the deterministic part of the income, the last term
is the stochastic part,  is a constant (to be discussed later), W(t) is a standard
Brownian motion.
Since in our model all agents are identically risk-averse ex-ante, they evade taxes
as soon as the return on tax evasion is positive, or  r > 0. Thus, the value of after-tax
income is random and depends on being caught and penalized for tax evasion or being
successful in the act of tax evasion.
The households in their pursuit of utility maximization face a resource constraint
in deciding what part of their income to consume and what part to save. As the
households are facing stochastic disposable incomes depending on the success of tax
evasion, the amount of capital accumulation also follows a stochastic process. Based
on our assumption that the random part of the disposable income of the agents follows
the Brownian motion, and following Merton’s (1969) model on the portfolio allocation,
the amount of capital accumulation can be expressed as
dk(t) = [(1    +  re(t))y(t)   c(t)]dt + [e(t)y(t)]dW (5)
where  is the standard deviation of the normalized process of random return on tax
evasion.9
The argument of the production function in (1),
g(t)
k(t), can be expressed in terms of
the tax rate. Note that






8See Chang (2004) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for details.
9See Appendix for derivation.
6Clearly, (1   re(t)) is an eﬀective compliance rate, as the eﬀective tax rate is equal to
the product of the statutory tax rate and this parameter.





= A(1    re(t)) (7)
Using (7), expression (1) can be written as




k(t)[(1    re(t))]
1 
 (8)
2.1. The household’s optimization
An individual household maximizes its expected overall utility by choosing consump-









s:t:dk = [(1    +  re(t))y(t)   c(t)]dt + [e(t)y(t)]dW (10)
0  c(t)  (1    +  re(t))y(t);0  k(t);k(0) = k0 (11)
0  e(t)  1 (12)
and (8)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator for the given initial value of capital,





ln(c(t)) + I0(k)([1    +  re(t)]y(t)   c(t)) + 1
2I00(k)[e(t)y(t)]2	
(13)
where I(k) is the value function.
Note, in this setup the output is a function of tax evasion as indicated earlier in















  1 + I




7A general solution to this diﬀerential equation can be expressed as
I(k) =
ln(k)+D
 , where D is a constant. Using this solution we obtain from (14) and
(15) the equilibrium consumption10






The results in (17) and (18) are obtained via the small agent assumption. Clearly, if
we take y(t) = Ak(t) as Lin and Yang (2001) do, higher taxes will discourage evasion,
contrary to their ﬁnding, and consonant with Yitzhaki’s (1974) result.











Hence, we have obtained an implicit expression for the tax evasion rate. We use this
expression to carry out comparative statics analysis and state the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1. The sign of
@e(t)
@ depends on whether the eﬀective compliance rate,
1    re(t), is greater or less than the output elasticity of public expenditure, 1   .
Proof Let us ﬁrst re-write (19) as



























It is clear that the sign of
@e(t)
@ depends on the sign of 1  
e(t) r(1 )
(1  re(t)), which can
be written as
  re(t)
(1  re(t)). Since the evasion rate and expected return to tax evasion are
less than one, the numerator determines the sign of this fraction. The numerator is
given by     re(t). When  re(t) >  holds we conclude that
@e(t)
@ > 0, while in case
 re(t) <  is true then
@e(t)
@ < 0. Alternatively,




k(t)) is ﬁxed as soon as
g(t)
y(t) is ﬁxed for a given 
(as in Barro 1990).
8if 1    re(t) < 1   ; then
@e(t)
@ > 0;
if 1    re(t) > 1   ; then
@e(t)
@ < 0:
Recall from (6) that 1    re(t) stands for the eﬀective compliance rate. Hence, the
comparative statics of the increase in the tax rate on the evasion rate depends on how
high the eﬀective compliance rate, 1    re(t), is and how large the output elasticity of
the public expenditure, 1   , is. 
Now, if  r is suﬃciently high (evading is attractive), and  is suﬃciently low (private
sector shares a small fraction of y(t) or the public sector already creates a lot of
positive externalities), then a rise in the tax rate leads to more evasion. A rise in 
increases marginal beneﬁt of cheating, but on the other hand greater evasion tends to
reduce the public good provision which would have increased output. However, when
the condition 1    re(t) < 1    holds the increased private gains from cheating more
than oﬀsets the eﬀect of the reduced public good provision.
2.2. The Lin and Yang environment with costly compliance
Cremer and Gahvari (1994) rigorously analyze how costly expenditures on income
concealment activities lower the likelihood of getting caught and inﬂuence the gov-
ernment design of the optimal linear tax schedule. Their realistic model delivers an
important theoretical ﬁnding that tax evasion, coupled with concealment costs can
considerably alter the redistributive eﬀect of the optimal income tax policy. Unfortu-
nately, theory has largely remained silent since the contribution of Cremer and Gahvari
(1994), although there is a relatively larger body of empirical literature emphasizing the
importance of the real costs associated with income tax compliance at the individual
level.
In this paper we aim to keep our setting simple in order to isolate the real costs
of tax evasion and income declaration which simultaneously can inﬂuence tax evasion
incentives. Therefore, we do not model the case with an endogenous probability of
detection, nor do we investigate the redistributive consequences of tax evasion and
costly compliance. We rather wonder how tax evasion incentives are aﬀected both by
compliance and non-compliance costs, and how the latter two together might alter
the optimal taxation rule of the government in the context of our model. As will be
seen shortly, our setting is in line with Cremer and Gahvari (1994) in the sense that it
accounts for the fact that not only does the burden of taxation fall on taxpayers in the
form of higher taxes and penalties, but also in the form of non-compliance expenditures.
At the same time our analysis includes compliance expenditures as well.11
11For the purpose of our paper we ignore the costs associated with the government’s audit practices,
which can be substantial in size. One simple way to capture the administrative costs is to assume
that they drain a constant fraction of tax revenues collected. Lin and Yang (2001) show that such a
setting should not alter the main results of their model.
9To strike a balance between realism and analytical tractability, we introduce two
additional parameters, 1 and 2, governing the structure of the costly compliance and
evasion. One can think of 1 and 2 as the marginal ineﬃciency losses of income
declaration and income concealment, respectively. In so doing, we take to the heart
Lin and Yang’s observation that increasing tax evasion raises evasion costs on the one
hand, but lowers compliance costs on the other hand.
The compliance cost is borne by the taxpayer when she pays taxes voluntarily or
when caught for evasion and forced to pay the unpaid taxes. For simplicity we assume
that the total compliance cost is proportional to the income declared or found to
be taxable. Hence, the total cost of compliance is given by 1(1   re(t))y(t), and
r =  r   2.
The evasion cost includes ineﬃciency losses related to hiding income and bribing
tax inspectors. The evasion cost is borne when the taxpayer evades tax by concealing
her income, and even when she is caught the cost cannot be recovered. So in case of
detection the taxpayer incurs both costs. The eﬀect of this cost is a decrease in the
expected return to tax evasion without changing the variance, as this cost must be
borne at any instance of tax evasion, and hence the variation of the outcomes for tax
evasion act does not change.
Hence, (10) becomes
dk(t) = [(1    + re(t)( + 1))y(t)   c(t)]dt + [e(t)y(t)]dW (22)
k(0) = given (23)





lnc(t) + J0(k)[(1    + re(t)( + 1))y(t)   c(t)] + 1
2J00(k)[e(t)y(t)]2	
Clearly, the taxpayer’s optimal consumption and evasion proﬁles are given similarly to
(17) and (19) by









Considerring the eﬀect of an increase in the compliance and non-compliance costs
on tax evasion, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2. An increase in the compliance and noncompliance costs has an
ambigous eﬀect on tax evasion:










Proof Consider the eﬀect of an increase in compliance cost, 1. To determine this we
consider the comparative statics,
@e(t)














where  = 1 

































as the nominator and the ﬁrst term in the denominator are positive. This further boils
down to the following expression that determines the sign of the expression
1   (1 + )re(t)
Analogously, we can determine the eﬀect of an increase in the cost of noncompli-
ance. Applying the Chain Rule to the modiﬁed version of (26) with regards to the cost















Again from (28) we infer that the sign of the comparative statics depends on the sign
of the expression, 1   (1 + )re(t).

11Although, analytically the eﬀect of increase in the compliance cost is not clear, a
calibration of the comparative statics by assuming a range of feasible values for , , r,
and e(t), it can be shown that an increase in the compliance cost leads to an increase
in tax evasion, whereas an increase in the noncompliance cost-to a decrease. The
important message we carry out from this exercise is that decreasing the compliance
cost does not always lead to an increase in compliance, as well as increasing the
compliance cost may not result in more tax evasion.
2.3. Optimal Tax Policies
The optimal tax rate depends on the optimal size of the government, as taxation is
just the way of raising funds to ﬁnance the public expenditure. Thus, the question of
optimal taxation becomes: what is the growth-maximizing public expenditure share in
the total output? Barro (1990) has shown that to be optimal public expenditure should
satisfy the natural condition of productive eﬃciency, that is the size of the public sector
expenditure share,
g(t)
y(t), is set so that the marginal product of the public input satisﬁes
dy(t)
dg(t) = 1. The intuition here is that the marginal beneﬁt of the productive public input
should be equalized with the cost it incurs as marginal tax burden. It is clear that for
the system with proportional income tax, the optimal tax rate, , is found based on
the optimal public expenditure share,  =
g(t)
y(t), satisfying the optimal condition we
discussed. In other words, the optimal marginal tax burden is equal to the statutory
tax rate.
In the presence of tax evasion, the statutory tax rate is not equal to the tax burden,
as some part of income is concealed from taxation. This implies that the growth-
maximizing government is interested in satisfying the condition of productive eﬃciency
and sets the statutory tax rate such that the tax burden equals to the optimal public
expenditure share. Assuming that tax evasion does not cause any losses except the
tax revenue collected, an introduction of tax evasion does not change the optimality
condition for the public sector size.
With no tax evasion (denoted by index “ne” for short), the growth rate per capita
is inverted U in the tax rate, as in Barro (1990). Using (5) with e(t) = 0, (8) and
(17), we obtain the growth rate for this economy as (see Lin and Yang 2001, p. 1833
for details)




    (29)
















Set (30) equal to zero to ﬁnd

 = 1    (31)
12Clearly,
@ne
@ is negative when  > 1    and positive when  < 1   . For the other
extreme, ( = 0), it is easy to see that ne j=0 < ne j=1 .
Now consider the case when there is tax evasion (denoted by index “e” for short)
in the economy. We can state here the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3. The growth rate per capita in the presence of tax evasion is maxi-




e = 1   
Proof Using (5), (17) and (8) we can state the growth rate of the economy with tax
evasion as
e = [1   (1   re(t))]A
1
 [(1   re(t))]
1 
    (32)
From (6) it is easy to see that the eﬀective tax burden, g(t)=y(t) ( e), is (1  
re(t)). We then can rewrite (32) as





e    (33)
Then the problem of maximizing is formally identical to the case without tax evasion
given by (29), with the only diﬀerence that now the tax burden is not equal to the
statutory tax rate. It follows that


e = 1    (34)







Therefore, by adjusting the statutory tax rate for the losses in the government rev-
enue due to evasion, the optimal public input supply is restored and growth rate is
maximized.
Proposition 2.3 implies that as long as the government ensures that for any given
level of evasion, 1    fraction of the output turns into the public good, the growth
rate is maximized. Alternatively, the rule for the statutory tax rate is given by (35),
which is directly related to the evasion rate.
The important implication of the above analysis can be summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.4. As long as the government ensures that the eﬀective tax burden equals
to the degree of the externalities it generates, the per capita growth rate of the
economies with tax evasion and costless compliance will exactly equal to that of the
economy with full compliance.






    (36)
For the economy with tax evasion but costless compliance, we can substitute (34) into
(33) to obtain that the resulting e exactly equals to (36). 
In other words, if the government credibly commits itself to spending 1  fraction
of the national income on public goods, the resulting per capita economic growth will
be equalized across the otherwise identical economies with or without tax evasion.
Now consider the case with costly compliance and income declaration (1 > 0 and
2 > 0). We can use (22), (25) and (8) to state the growth rate as






e    (37)
where “underscore” is used to distinguish the economy with costly compliance/evasion,
e = (1   re(t)). Clearly, with 1 = 2 = 0, r becomes equal to r, and expression
(37) becomes identical to expression (33). Since the government is concerned with
choosing only g(t)=y(t) ( e) optimally in this economy, it can treat evasion as given.
Thus we can state here the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5. The government in the economy with costly compliance/evasion de-
votes a larger fraction of output for the provision of pubic goods.




e = (1   )(1 + r1e(t)) (38)
which uniquely determines the optimal statutory tax rate





Note when 1 = 2 = 0, (38) and (39) are identical to (34) and (35), respectively.
Since 1 and r exceed zero, 
e exceeds 
e.
The implication we can derive from this section is that when the government op-
timally lets the government size grow at the same rate as output like in Barro (1990)
when g(t)=y(t) = 1   , the economy without tax evasion and with it (but costless
compliance/concealment) will have the same growth rates per capita. But when in
the economy tax evasion is coupled with costly concealment/compliance, the growth-
maximizing government share in output exceeds the benchmark public expenditure-to
output ratio satisfying the natural eﬃciency condition.
143. Conclusion
A baseline static model of income tax evasion predicts that taxpayers, in response to
a higher tax rate, will decrease tax evasion (Yitzhaki 1974). Such a puzzling theoretical
relationship has been one of the major focuses of study in the income tax evasion
literature for the past thirty years. However, in analyzing the puzzling relationship, the
literature often deviated signiﬁcantly from the initial set of model assumptions. On the
contrary, simply by extending the Yitzhaki (1974) model from a static to a dynamic
framework, Lin and Yang (2001) ﬁnd that higher taxes encourage tax evasion in an
economy with Ak(t) technology. In this paper we revisit the Lin and Yang (2001)
model by making it fully compatible with the Yitzhaki (1974) setting. As a result, we
show that higher taxes discourage tax evasion in an economy with Ak(t) technology.
Further, the literature on tax evasion generally ignored the possible implications of
the productive input provided by the public sector, as well as the real costs associated
with income declaration and concealment activities. We extend the Lin and Yang
(2001) model along these lines and establish an ambiguous theoretical relationship
between taxes and honesty incentives. The latter result is compatible with a wide array
of empirical literature. We also prove that the growth-maximizing size of the public
sector is consonant with traditional natural eﬃciency condition of the government size
in an economy with tax evaders but costless compliance/evasion. Once tax evasion and
income declaration become costly, however, the growth-maximizing tax rate is above
the rate satisfying the natural eﬃciency condition for the government size.
Appendix
Here we show how the stochastic diﬀerential equation (5) can be derived as the
continuous limit of a discrete-time problem. Assume that r is a Brownian motion with
drift  r and variance 2 deﬁned for all t and is stated as:
r(t) = r(0) +  rt + W(t) (40)
where W is a Wiener process. By deﬁnition E[W(t)] = 0, and V ar[W(t)] = t.
Hence,12
E[r(t)   r(0)] =  rt (41)
V ar[r(t)   r(0)] = 
2t (42)
Let x = rh be random return on h dollars of evaded tax in a time period of
t, where r is deﬁned as above.The random variable x has a Bernoulli distribution
x = h with probability 1   ,
12See Breiman (1968, prop. 12.4) for a proof.
15x =  sh = (1   )h with probability .
Then over each time increment t, our stochastic process of tax evasion is character-
ized by the mean
E[x] = (1   )h + (1   )h = (1   )h (43)
and the variance







2 + (1   )(h)
2 = (h)
2[1   (1   s
2)]
(E[x])
2 = [(1   )h]
2
the expression for variance is simpliﬁed to
V ar(x) = (1   )(h)
2 (44)
For a time interval of length t = 1 we have 1
t discrete steps. The cumulated








To make our binomial variate to converge to a Brownian motion we choose  and




















Substitute these expressions for h and  in (45) and (46) and let t go to zero.




















































Then, following Merton (1969) and Lin and Yang (2001), it can be veriﬁed that
capital accumulation is given by
dk(t) = [(1    +  re(t))y(t)   c(t)]dt + [e(t)y(t)]dW (51)
That is the equation of capital accumulation given in (5).
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